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“Progress in the specific is thwarted by failures in the general”.1
1 Introduction
The study of the organizational and technological structure of the firm has been recently enriched
by the analysis of complementarity that can arise between diﬀerent activities which constitute a
production project. The marginal return from implementing a certain activity can be increased in
the presence of other types of activities. However, scant attention has been devoted to the means
through which the firm obtains the initial resources that are often necessary to finance investment
projects. The present paper provides a link between two diﬀerent streams of literature: firm’s
innovative activity and financial contracting. Our aim is to build a framework to analyse situations
in which the exploitation of complementarity depends on the access to external finance.
We consider a risk-neutral start-up entrepreneurial firm which could potentially act as a mo-
nopolist by exploiting a patent on a new product. Nonetheless, the initial structure of demand
and cost functions are such that equilibrium production is zero. The firm then decides to invest
in a project based on two diﬀerent activities aiming at demand enhancing and cost reducing, re-
spectively, but is wealth constrained. The former stochastically enlarges market demand while the
latter stochastically decreases unit cost of production. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to
marketing as the demand enhancing activity and to (process) R&D as the cost reducing activity.2
An important feature of the model is that the nature of the two activities makes the joint
investment more profitable than the sum of the separate investments, i.e., the two activities are
complementary. The study of interconnected subsytems linked by complementarity relationships
has been applied to the theory of firm (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 and 1995) and has revealed
the existence of diﬀerent types of investments that increase their respective marginal returns when
they are undertaken at the same time. In particular, Athey and Schmutzler (1995) and Lin and
Saggi (2002) investigate the relationship between process and product innovation and show that
firms invest more in product innovation when they can undertake also process innovation.
In our model we assume that the two activities are performed by independent units inside the
firm. The introductory quotation from Kling et al. (1992) refers to the general fact that special-
ization is a fundamental aspect of economic systems because it permits greater accomplishments.
Nonetheless, it could reduce the individual’s ability to deal with the full array of resources available
1Kling et al. (1992).
2This definition of marketing is very general and encompasses diﬀerent types of activities that are often linked to
demand enlargement, e.g., product innovation and advertising.
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in the economic environment. We explicitly consider the possibility of the firm to overcoming the
dilemma by coordinating the interdependency among specialized individuals, groups, or subunits.3
Surplus of the project is maximum when activities are coordinated.
The management literature recognizes the positive eﬀects of intraorganizational coordination -
the creation of a system that catalyses the flows of information originated in each unit and allows
for a more eﬃcient usage of resources.4 In particular, many works tend to analyse coordination
through computerization in manufacturing systems and specify the relative eﬀects on agency and
transaction costs, with the aim of studying the internal organization and the optimal size of the
firm (Kling et al.,1992; Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991; Kling et al.,1996).
We start from a diﬀerent perspective. In our model coordination can be made either by using
internal resources (i.e., inside mode) or by hiring a consulting firm that provides the connection
between the units of the firm (i.e., outside mode). We justify this assumption on the basis of the
stylized fact that very often consulting firms are hired to reinforce and confirm the necessity of
adopting some drastic measures rather than to provide new solutions to existing problems. As
we will show, agency costs arise when the firm chooses the internal mode and take the form of
informational rent paid by the bank that lends money to the firm. When the firm turns to the
market to obtain coordination services, it gives up the rent and no agency costs are present. We
do not study how coordination is technically implemented and we consider no separation between
ownership and control of the firm; in addition, we abstract from the transaction costs related to
using the market to procure what the firm needs instead of making it itself.
The firm is endowed with a certain amount of initial capital which is not enough to finance
the project: as anticipated above, it needs external finance. It is well known in the corporate
finance literature that bank finance is the main source of funding for start-up firms. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show, in their seminal papers, that (bank) debt is
3Consider for example a preliminary market research that indicates that consumers prefer certain features of the
good. The marketing unit can tailor the advertising campaign to highlight such features, while the R&D unit can
reduce costs by saving on the less attractive features. Consumers’ satisfaction increases, thus raising the probability
of success of both activities.
4The rise of computerized networks has made it possible to codify, store and share diﬀerent kinds of infomation
more easily and cheaply than before. Recent knowledge management practises based on CIT (Communication
and Information Technology) have driven firms to adopt softwares like the ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) to
integrate all departments and functions of a company into a single computer system that can serve all diﬀerent
departments’ particular needs. Each department usually has its own computer system optimized for the particular
task that the department does. ERP combines them all together into a single and integrated software program that
runs oﬀ a single database. In this way the various departments can more easily share information and communicate
with each other.
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the most eﬃcient way of financing when there is no separation between ownership and control and,
respectively, incentive or information problems. In a more recent contribution, Petersen and Rajan
(1994) argue that a start-up firm benefits from building close ties with a bank because it increases
the availability of financing. On the basis of these features we assume that the firm will apply for a
bank loan to implement both activities. We consider a risk-neutral monopolistic bank that designs
the loan. The bank’s outside option is represented by investing in alternative activities. When the
firm chooses the inside mode a moral hazard problem arises (Holmstrom, 1979; Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981) because the coordination cost is non transferable. The firm decides whether to bear the cost
or not after the contract is signed and we assume that the bank cannot verify the choice. On the
contrary, when the firm decides to avail itself of an outside consulting service, the coordination cost
becomes transferable and the amount of borrowing reveals the information. The firm demands in
fact an amount equal to the sum of investment plus coordination costs. The bank knows then that
the firm will implement coordination because otherwise it will incur very high rescission costs to
cancel the contract with the consulting agency.
At equilibrium we consider the interest rate proposed by the bank as a function of the coor-
dination cost and its implication for the level of surplus, defined as the sum of the bank’s utility
and the firm’s utility. We focus in particular on two diﬀerent scenarios, depending on the utility
level that the bank extracts from the complementary project relative to its outside options. For
relatively low levels of complementarity, the firm chooses the outside mode because by hiring a
consulting agency it gains access to funds. Moreover, we show that surplus is at its highest. On
the contrary, for relatively high levels of complementarity, the firm is indiﬀerent between the two
modes because there is no threat of credit rationing. We verify that surplus is not maximized when
the inside mode is chosen because the firm prefers not to coordinate, whereas surplus is eﬃcient
under the outside mode because such a choice represents a credible promise of coordination.
In our framework the role of consulting services is to mitigate the informational problems. If
the firm decides not to resort to them, either it obtains no funding or it does not maximize surplus.
On the contrary, if the firm avails itself of the consulting surplus is at its highest, because the firm
always coordinates.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model and its
main assumptions. Section 3 and 4 study the characteristics of the loan under inside and outside
mode of coordinating, respectively. Section 5 considers the equilibrium analysis. Finally, Section 6
provides the main conclusions.
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2 The Model
In this section we describe the complementary nature of the project and the possibility of improving
the complementarity eﬀect by coordinating the activities. We then define the inside and the outside
modes of coordination and we introduce financial constraints for the firm. The last part summarizes
the contracting game between the bank and the firm and the timing of the model.
2.1 Complementarity
Consider a risk-neutral monopolistic firm that, at t = −1, faces demand P = a −Q/4 and whose
marginal production cost is constant and equal to c. The equilibrium quantity is Q = 2 (a− c) and
the equilibrium profit is (a − c)2. Let a = c: the firm does not produce because the demand is
relatively low (or, equivalently, because the cost is relatively high). At t = 0 the firm can invest
a fixed amount Ka in a marketing activity that shifts a by ∆a with probability p and by 0 with
probability (1− p), and a fixed amount Kc in a R&D activity that lowers c by ∆c with probability q
and by 0 with probability (1− q). At t = 1, once uncertainty is resolved, the firm starts producing.
We formalize the notion of complementarity between the two activities on which the project is
based to show that the firm always prefer the joint investment in the two activities. Let Π(i, j)
define (net) expected surplus of the investment, where i ( j) = {1, 0} denote whether marketing
(R&D) activity is implemented or not. We obtain that:
1. Π (0, 0) = 0 represents surplus when the firm does not invest at all (in such a case it would
not produce as well).
2. Π (1, 0) = p∆2a −Ka represents expected surplus when the firm only finances the marketing
activity; demand shifts with probability p, the firm sets an equilibrium quantity equal to
2 (∆a) and gets an equilibrium profit equal to ∆2a; with probability (1− p) demand is stuck
and the firm does not produce.
3. Π (0, 1) = q∆2c −Kc represents expected surplus in case of investment in R&D; production
costs decrease with probability q, the firm sets an equilibrium quantity equal to 2 (∆c) and
gets ∆2c ; with probability (1− q), as before, the firm does not produce.
4. Π (1, 1) = pq (∆a +∆c)
2+p (1− q)∆2a+q (1− p)∆2c−(Ka +Kc) represents expected surplus
in case of simultaneous investment in marketing and R&D; with probability pq both activities
succeed, hence equilibrium quantity and profit are given respectively by 2 (∆a +∆c) and
(∆a +∆c)
2; with probability p (1− q) only marketing succeeds, then the firm produces 2 (∆a)
and obtains ∆2a; with probability q (1− p) only R&D succeeds, then the firm produces 2 (∆c)
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and obtains ∆2c ; finally, with probability (1− p) (1− q) both activities fail and the firm does
not produce.
Assume for simplicity that q = p. We have that:
Π (1, 1) = p2 (∆a +∆c)
2 + p (1− p)∆2a + (1− p) p∆2c − (Ka +Kc) (1)
It is easy to verify that:
Proposition 1 Π is a supermodular function on {0, 1} × {0, 1}, i.e.,
Π(1, 1) +Π(0, 0) ≥ Π(1, 0) +Π(0, 1).
Proof. By solving the above inequality one easily finds that:
[Π (1, 1) +Π (0, 0)]− [Π (1, 0) +Π (0, 1)] = p2 2∆a∆c > 0,
where p22∆a∆c represents the expected value of the complementarity gain.
Surplus due to the simultaneous implementation of both activities exceeds the sum of the
individual surpluses. This formalizes the notion of complementary investment opportunities.
2.2 Coordination
In our model we introduce the possibility of streamlining the production process by improving
the complementarity eﬀect. This happens when the firm chooses to coordinate the units that are
responsible for each activity at a (fixed) cost C. Assume, again for simplicity, that coordination
makes the probability of success of each activity perfectly correlated. Let ΠC (1, 1) the expected
surplus of the project with coordination, which derives from the following contingent production
plan: either both activities succeed with probability p, then the firm sets 2 (∆a +∆c) and obtains
(∆a +∆c)
2, or both fail, with probability (1− p), and the firm does not produce. Surplus is:
ΠC (1, 1) = p (∆a +∆c)
2 − (Ka +Kc)−C. (2)
Let coordination be eﬃcient, i.e.,
ΠC (1, 1) ≥ Π (1, 1) ,
which, after rearranging, gives the following condition:
C ≤
¡
p− p2
¢
2∆a∆c = C. (3)
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Condition (3) will hold throughout the paper. The coordination cost is thereby suﬃciently low to
ensure that coordination increases the expected value of the complementarity gain.
We allow two diﬀerent options regarding the mode of coordinating: on the one hand, the
firm can choose to employ internal resources to ameliorate the flow of information between the
marketing and the R&D unit, i.e., it performs inside coordination. On the other hand, it can
choose to delegate this task to a consulting company against the payment of a fixed amount. This
will be referred to as outside coordination. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that both inside
and outside coordination costs are equal to C.
2.3 Credit
We study the case in which the firm has an initial endowment equal toKc < Ka that can be invested
either in R&D or in the bond market where Bf is the gross interest rate.5 In the former case the
firm gets Π (0, 1) , while (Bf − 1)Kc represents the return in the latter one. Let (Bf − 1)Kc >
Π (0, 1) ⇐⇒ ∆2c <
BfKc
p
. Without financial aid the firm invests in bonds: U = (Bf − 1)Kc
represents its outside option.
The firm can borrow from a risk-neutral monopolistic bank the amount of money necessary to
finance the investment project. We suppose that there are many firms with good projects and fewer
banks looking for good investment opportunities, so that our bank has all the bargaining power.
The bank designs a loan [R], where R is the gross interest rate and a limited liability constraint is
specified for the firm.
If the firm chooses not to coordinate, surplus amounts to Π (1, 1) and the borrowing to Ka. Let
∆2c < Ka: when only R&D succeeds, the firm goes bankrupt even if R = 1. Surplus is thus shared
between the firm and the bank in the following way:
U = p2
h
(∆a +∆c)
2 −RKa
i
+ p(1− p)max
©
∆2a −RKa, 0
ª
−Kc (4)
is the utility of the firm and
V = p2RKa + p (1− p)min
©
RKa, ∆
2
a
ª
+ (1− p) p∆2c −Ka (5)
the utility of the bank.
On the other hand, when marketing and R&D are coordinated surplus is ΠC (1, 1). If the
firm selects the internal mode of coordination, the amount C is assumed to be nonmonetary and
5The assumption Kc < Ka reflects the stylized fact that investing to expand market size is generally more costly
than investing to lower the cost of production. Note that the strategy of investing αKc, with 0 < α < 1, in one
activity and (1− α)Kc in the other, which again exploits complementarity, is not available, because we assume that
the costs required to implement the two activities are indivisible.
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nontransferable and the bank has to directly monitor the units responsible for the two activities
in order to observe whether the firm coordinates or not. We assume that the cost of monitoring
is infinite, hence the bank cannot verify the choice of the firm: a form of moral hazard is present.
Borrowing amounts to Ka and utility of the firm and of the bank are respectively given by:
UC = p
h
(∆a +∆c)
2 −RKa
i
− (Kc + C) , (6)
V C = pRKa −Ka. (7)
If the external mode is implemented C is assumed to be monetary and transferable. The firm
then applies for (Ka + C) and reveals that it wants to coordinate: no moral hazard problem arises
because the choice of coordination is made before the contract and we assume that it is verified by
the bank. Surplus ΠC (1, 1) is shared between the firm and the bank as follows:
U 0C = p
h
(∆a +∆c)
2 −R (Ka +C)
i
−Kc, (8)
V 0C = pR (Ka + C)− (Ka +C). (9)
In other words, the bank has only to check the invoice of the consulting firm when coordination
is outside. We assume that the cost of this operation is zero. The problem of credibility of the
firm’s commitment to coordinate will be solved by assuming that the bank observes and verifies a
conveniently high cost F of cancelling the contract between the firm and the consulting company.
The bank’s outside option is to invest in alternative assets which give an utility equal to V .
2.4 Game and Timing
The contracting game between the two agents is defined as follows. The set of players is {F,B},
where F is the firm and B is the bank. Player F selects a strategy from the set AF = {I,O}, where
I is the choice of inside mode of coordination and O the choice of outside mode of coordination.
Player B observes the choice of player F and selects a strategy from the set AB = {RR,R∅, ∅R, ∅∅},
where RR represents the choice of granting the loan [R] for any strategy of the firm, R∅ and ∅R
the choice of granting the loan only when the firm selects I or O, respectively, and ∅∅ the choice of
granting no loan for any strategy of the firm.
The timing of the model is as follows.
1. At t = 0
8
• the firm sets a contingent production plan to exploit complementarity, chooses between
internal and external modes of coordination and applies for Ka and (Ka +C), respec-
tively, to the bank;
• the bank decides whether to propose a take-it or leave-it loan or not; in the former case
the parties sign the contract.
2. Between t = 0 and t = 1
• when the internal mode of coordinating is selected, the bank cannot verify whether the
firm coordinates or not: a form of moral hazard is thus present;
• when the external mode is chosen, the firm credibly commits to coordinate: no moral
hazard problem arises.
3. At t = 1 returns accrue, the firm, which has no time preference, starts production and repays
the bank (in case of the outside mode it also pays the consulting company).
The analysis proceeds as follows. In the following two sections we study the characteristics of
the loan proposed by the bank when the mode of coordination is chosen to be inside or outside,
respectively, and the participation constraint of the bank is not binding.6 In Section 5 we focus
on two diﬀerent cases, depending whether the bank’s participation constraint is binding for some
values of C (low complementarity case) or not (high complementarity case). We then analyse how
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game changes with C in each of the two cases.
3 Inside Mode of Coordination
Consider the case in which the firm uses internal human resources to coordinate. The bank oﬀers
a loan [R] to maximize its utility. Recall that ∆2c < Ka: when only R&D succeeds, the firm goes
bankrupt even if R = 1.
If the firm coordinates, expected surplus amounts to ΠC (1, 1) and it is shared between the
firm, that obtains UC , and the bank, that receives V C . If the firm does not coordinate, surplus
Π (1, 1) is produced, the firm gets U and the bank gets V . In this case, one should note that with
probability p (1− p) only marketing succeeds and firm’s ability to repay depends on the bank’s
choice of R. If the bank decides to set R > ∆
2
a
Ka
, the firm goes bankrupt. On the contrary, when
R ≤ ∆
2
a
Ka
the firm can repay the debt obligations. We show in the Appendix that at equilibrium
6When the bank does not participate, i.e., when it does not grant the loan, the vector of utilities is
¡
U, V
¢
.
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the bank sets R > ∆
2
a
Ka
for any value of C, hence U = p2
h
(∆a +∆c)
2 −RKa
i
− Kc and V =
p2RKa + p (1− p)∆2a + (1− p) p∆2c −Ka.
Program α is solved by the bank when it wants to induce the firm to coordinate:
max
R
V C (α)
s.t. UC ≥ U (ICα) , UC ≥ U (IRα) ,
where ICα is the incentive compatibility constraint which states that firm’s utility is higher when
it coordinates and IRα is the participation constraint which ensures that firm’s utility in case of
coordination is greater than the outside option.
Program β is solved by the bank when it induces the firm not to coordinate:
max
R
V (β)
s.t. U ≥ UC (ICβ) , U ≥ U (IRβ) ,
where ICβ is the incentive compatibility constraint which states that firm’s utility is higher when it
does not coordinate and IRβ is the participation constraint which ensures that firm’s utility when
it does not coordinate is greater than the outside option.
The IC constraints are binding for:
RIC =
(∆a +∆c)
2
Ka
− C
(p− p2)Ka
. (10)
The IRα and IRβ constraints are binding when, respectively:
RIRα =
(∆a +∆c)
2
Ka
− BfKc + C
pKa
,
RIRβ =
(∆a +∆c)
2
Ka
− BfKc
p2Ka
. (11)
Henceforth we assume that the indiﬀerent firm applies for the bank loan when the participation
constraint is binding and decides to coordinate when the incentive constraint is binding. An ε
reasoning may be used to make the argument more appealing.
Under symmetric information the bank would always leave the firm with the reservation utility
and would prefer to induce coordination. Nevertheless, given that under inside mode C is non
transferable, the choice of the firm is assumed to be nonverifiable and noncontractable. As a
consequence, the bank faces a trade-oﬀ: its utility is linearly increasing in R, but when R > RIC
(namely, the ICβ constraint is satisfied) the firm does not coordinate, thus reducing total surplus
to be split. Under asymmetric information the bank is then forced to propose a lower interest rate
to induce the firm to coordinate.
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We analyze how the bank’s choice of R changes with C. First of all, it is worth noting that
RIRα < RIC ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ C < C1, (12)
where C1 =
1−p
p BfKc. If C belongs to this interval (i.e., C is very small), informational asymmetry
disappears because the bank knows that the firm, if participates, chooses coordination for any R.
The interest rate is set such that the firm’s utility is equal to the reservation value, namely RIRα .
Surplus is shared in the following way:
V C (RIRα , C) = Π
C (1, 1)− U (13)
to the bank, while the firm receives UC = U .
When C1 ≤ C ≤ C, we have RIC ≤ RIRβ , where C derives from (3). The bank compares the
utility when it sets RIC , the maximum interest rate that induces coordination, with the one when
it sets RIRβ , the maximum interest rate that induces participation without coordination.
When the contract is [RIC ] , the bank gets
V C (RIC , C) = p (∆a +∆c)
2 −Ka −
µ
1 +
p
1− p
¶
C, (14)
while the firm obtains:
UC (RIC , C) =
p
1− pC −Kc. (15)
Note that UC (RIC) is increasing in C because it represents a compensation for the coordination
cost. Moreover, UC (RIC) ≥ U ⇐ C1 ≤ C ≤ C: the firm receives an informational rent.
When the contract is
£
RIRβ
¤
, the bank’s utility is
V
¡
RIRβ
¢
= Π (1, 1)− U (16)
and the firm receives the reservation utility.
Comparing the two possible utility levels of the bank, we obtain:
V C (RIC , C) ≥ V
¡
RIRβ
¢
⇐⇒ C ≤ C2, (17)
where C2 = (1− p) [p (1− p) 2∆a∆c +BfKc]. When C > C2, the informational rent is so high
that the bank finds it profitable not to induce coordination.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 p22∆a∆c ≥ BfKc ⇐⇒ C1 ≤ C2 ≤ C.
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The assumption states that the firm’s outside option is low with respect to the complementarity
gain. Henceforth we take into account the above interval. The expressions for the bank’s utility
and the firm’s utility are the following:
V =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
V C (RIRα , C) = Π
C (1, 1)− U ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ C ≤ C1
V C (RIC , C) = ΠC (1, 1)−
³
p
1−pC −Kc
´
⇐⇒ C1 < C ≤ C2
V
¡
RIRβ
¢
= Π (1, 1)− U ⇐⇒ C2 < C ≤ C
(18)
U =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
UC (RIRα) = U ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ C ≤ C1
UC (RIC , C) =
p
1−pC −Kc ⇐⇒ C1 < C ≤ C2
U
¡
RIRβ
¢
= U ⇐⇒ C2 < C ≤ C
(19)
Figure 1 : Utility of the bank and utility of the firm under the inside mode of coordination.
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Figure 1 represents the above utilities as a function of C. The utility function of the bank is
piecewise linear and decreasing in C. In particular, it sharply decreases for C ∈ (C1, C2] when the
firm exploits the asymmetry of information to gain an informational rent. Note in fact that the
utility function of the firm remains constant at its participation value except for (C1, C2], where it
is strictly increasing.7
4 Outside Mode of Coordination
Consider the situation in which the firm chooses to avail itself of outside coordination services, i.e.,
the firm pays C to a consulting company to obtain perfect correlation between the two activities.
Coordination cost is now transferable and there is no moral hazard.
The bank proposes a loan [R] where R is the (gross) interest rate. The amount of the loan
increases to (Ka + C) because the coordination action is now contractable: the bank observes
the agreement between the firm and the consulting company and lends C to allow the firm to
coordinate the activities. The choice of external mode is equivalent to a credible promise of coordi-
nation because we assume that the contract between the firm and the consulting company entails
a suﬃciently high rescission cost that the bank observes.8
The bank then solves the following problem:
max
R
V 0C s.t. U 0C ≥ U, (γ)
where U 0C and V 0C are defined by (8) and (9). The utility of the bank is at its highest when R is
such that the constraint is binding. By solving U 0C = U for R, we have
R0 =
(∆a +∆c)
2
Ka + C
− BfKc
p (Ka + C)
. (20)
The firm receives the reservation utility U 0 = U and the bank gets:
V 0 = V 0C ¡R0, C¢ = ΠC (1, 1)− U. (21)
7The lowest equilibrium interest rate for programs α and β is
min
©
RIRα (C1) , RIC(C2), RIRβ
ª
=
∆2a +∆
2
c
Ka
+
p22∆a∆c −BfKc
pKa
Assumption 1 ensures that this value is higher than ∆
2
a
Ka
.
8More precisely, if the firm decides to pocket C and not to coordinate, it has to pay an amount F to the consulting
company to cancel the contract. In this case utility of the firm is given by (C − F )+p2
£
(∆a +∆c)
2 −R0(Ka +C)
¤
−
Kc, where R0 is defined by (21). This value is assumed to be lower than U . By consequence the firm prefers to
coordinate. Note also that for any F > 0 the utility of the firm when decides to pocket C and to coordinate by using
internal resources is lower than U .
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In Figure 2 we depict the utility of the bank and the utility of the firm, when the latter chooses
the outside mode.
Figure 2 : Utility of the bank and utility of the firm under the outside mode of coordination.
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5 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we study the equilibrium of the model by taking into account the bank’s decision of
granting the loan and the firm’s choice between the modes of coordination. One should remember
the possibility for the bank to invest in alternative assets which give an utility equal to V : the
bank compares the utility that it extracts from financing the firm with returns from such alternative
assets.
We consider two possible scenarios that depend on the relative level of complementarity.
14
Definition (i) Complementarity is low if V
¡
RIRβ
¢
< V ≤ V C (RIRα , C1); (ii) complementarity
is high if V ≤ V
¡
RIRβ
¢
.9
The equilibrium analysis takes into account the utility of the firm and the utility of the bank
as functions of C. The contracting game is solved by backward induction in order to study how
the SPNE in pure strategies changes with C. We proceed in three steps:
1. We verify whether the bank oﬀers the loan or not, by comparing the utility that the bank
extracts from the complementary project to the outside option V . If the former is lower the
bank does not grant the loan and both the bank and the firm end up with their respective
reservation utilities. If the opposite holds, the loan is granted.
2. We compare firm’s utility under inside and outside modes of coordination and derive the
choice between the two ones.
3. We compute the equilibrium level of surplus, i.e., the sum of the bank’s and the firm’s utility,
as a function of C.
5.1 Low Complementarity and Equilibrium
We first consider the situation in which complementarity gains are low. We base the analysis on
the examination of Figure 3, where we depict the utility of the bank and the utility of the firm
under the two alternatives of inside and outside modes of coordination. The bold lines represent
the equilibrium utilities.
Let C∅ and C 0∅ be defined by the intersection between the straight line V and, respectively,
V C (RIC , C) and V 0C (R0, C):
C∅ = (1− p)
h
p (∆a +∆c)
2 −Ka − V
i
,
C 0∅ = p (∆a +∆c)
2 −Ka −BfKc − V ,
with C1 ≤ C∅ ≤ C0∅ ≤ C by construction.
First note that for C ∈ [0, C∅] the utility of the bank if the loan is oﬀered is not lower than V ,
therefore its equilibrium strategy is (RR) in such an interval.
For very low values of C (i.e., C ∈ [0, C1]) information is symmetric under both modes hence
the firm receives U and is indiﬀerent between inside and outside coordination. There are two
SPNE: (I,RR) and (O,RR). For C ∈ (C1, C∅] if the firm chooses the inside mode a moral hazard
9We omit two other (meaningless) cases that appear for very low values of complementarity, i.e. V C (RIRα , C1) <
V ≤ V C (RIRα , 0) and V C (RIRα , 0) < V .
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problem arises. In this case the bank oﬀers [RIC ], the firm then coordinates and receives an
informational rent which makes its utility strictly higher than the utility under the outside mode:
UC (RIC , C) > U . The SPNE is (I,RR).
Figure 3 : Low complementarity and equilibrium.
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The most interesting case arises for C ∈ (C∅, C 0∅], where the bank does not grant the loan if
the firm chooses the inside mode because the informational rent is too high, while it keeps on
contracting under the outside mode, where no informational rent is paid. The firm always gets the
reservation utility, but, given that it prefers to participate, it chooses the outside mode and the
bank proposes [R0]. The SPNE is (O, ∅R).
For C ∈ (C 0∅, C] the bank does not grant the loan for any strategy of the firm because its
outside option is more profitable, therefore the firm invests in bonds. Two are the SPNE: (I, ∅∅)
and (O, ∅∅).
When complementarity is low maximum surplus is given by ΠC (1, 1) for C ∈
£
0, C 0∅
¤
.10 It is
easy to verify that equilibrium surplus is always at its highest. We focus on the interval C ∈ (C∅, C 0∅]
to state the following:
10For C ∈ (C0∅, C] the maximum surplus is
¡
V + U
¢
.
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Proposition 2 When complementarity is low, the firm prefers the outside mode of coordination,
otherwise it does not receive the loan. Surplus is at its highest.
When complementarity is low and the firm bears a relatively low cost of coordination, then it
uses internal human resources because the nontransferability of C gives an additional informational
rent. On the other hand, when the cost is relatively high, the firm avails itself of the outside
consulting because the transfer of C eliminates the moral hazard problem and makes the loan
feasible. It is worth noting that surplus is maximum because the firm always decides to coordinate.
5.2 High Complementarity and Equilibrium
Consider the case in which complementarity gains are high. We base the analysis on the examination
of Figure 4, which represents an upward shift of the utility function of the bank (and/or a downward
shift of V ) with respect to Figure 3. As before, the bold lines denote the utility of the bank and
the one of the firm in equilibrium. Notice that the utility of the bank of it oﬀers the loan is higher
than V for any C, then its equilibrium strategy is (RR): the loan is always granted.
For C ∈ (0, C1] information is symmetric under both types of coordination and the firm gets
the reservation utility anyway: again, the SPNE are (I,RR) and (O,RR). For C ∈ (C1, C2] a
moral hazard problem arises under the inside mode. In this case, given that the bank oﬀers [RIC ],
the firm coordinates and receives an informational rent which makes its utility higher than in case
of the outside mode: UC (RIC , C) > U 0C ⇐= C1 < C ≤ C2. The SPNE is (I,RR).
The most interesting case arises for C ∈ (C2, C], where the firm gets the reservation utility
under both modes. If it chooses the inside mode, then the bank proposes
£
RIRβ
¤
and the firm does
not coordinate, while if it chooses the outside one, the bank oﬀers [R0] and the firm coordinates.
There are two SPNE: (I,RR) and (O,RR).
In case of high complementarity the firm does not strictly prefer outside coordination for any
value of C. Maximum surplus is given by ΠC (1, 1), but in (C2, C] equilibrium surplus is Π (1, 1) <
ΠC (1, 1) when the firm chooses the inside mode.
We focus on the interval C ∈ (C2, C] to state the following:
Proposition 3 When complementarity is high, the firm is indiﬀerent between the two modes of
coordination. If the inside mode is chosen surplus is not at its highest.
It is worth noting that the firm can decide not to resort to the outside mode because there is
no threat of credit rationing. This leads to a smaller surplus because the bank prefers to induce
the firm not to coordinate. The shaded area in Figure 4 represents such a potential loss of surplus.
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Figure 4 : High complementarity and equilibrium.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the investment problem of an entrepreneurial start-up firm which applies
for a bank loan to implement a production project based on two complementary activities, demand
enlargement and cost reduction. At the very heart of our model lies the assumption that firms can
improve the complementarity eﬀect by coordinating the activities, thus streamlining the production
process. Coordination consists of ameliorating the flow of information between the units that are
in charge of the two investment activities. Surplus of the project is at its highest when activities
are coordinated. We consider two modes of coordination: inside, where the firm reallocates internal
human resources, and outside, where it resorts to a consulting company’s competency. The choice
of coordination is not verifiable by the bank in the former case and a moral hazard problem arises,
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while in the latter one information is symmetric.
We consider the equilibrium repayment as a function of the coordination cost. Two scenarios
are taken into account: low complementarity, when the utility that the bank extracts from the
complementarity project is lower than the average return of alternative assets if the inside mode
is implemented, and high complementarity, when such an utility is higher. In case of low comple-
mentarity, the firm is obliged to resort to the outside company, otherwise it does not receive the
loan. Equilibrium surplus is at its highest. In other words, the firm that oﬀers a not very profitable
project faces the risk of not getting funded. When this is the case, it prefers to give up the infor-
mational rent and hire the consulting company. The equilibrium outcome is eﬃcient because the
firm credibly commits to coordinate. On the contrary, when the complementarity gain is high, the
firm never strictly prefers the outside mode of coordination because of absence of a credit rationing
threat. However, surplus is maximum only if the firm delegates the coordination task to an outside
agent. In fact the informational rent paid by the bank under the inside mode becomes excessive
and the bank prefers then to induce no coordination.
The role of consulting companies is justified in the current model as a means of mitigating
informational problems in credit markets where projects are characterized by complementarity
and coordination. More exactly: (i) worthwhile productive projects, that without the consulting
option would not have been funded, are undertaken; (ii) the firm eﬃciently performs the productive
project, i.e., it coordinates the activities that without the consulting option would not have been.
7 Appendix
Bankruptcy or not bankruptcy? Consider the case in which the bank decides to set R ≤
∆2a
Ka
, then the firm does not go bankrupt when only marketing succeeds. We limit our attention to
the new IC constraint,
UC R U 00 (A1)
where U 00 = p2
h
(∆a +∆c)
2 −RKa
i
+ p (1− p) [∆2a −RKa]−Kc represents the utility of the firm
when it does not coordinate. The left hand side of the IC constraint is greater than the right hand
side if and only if
C < p (1− p)
¡
2∆a∆c +∆
2
c
¢
(A2)
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which is always true because C < p (1− p)
¡
2∆a∆c +∆2c
¢
. The firm, if it participates, always
chooses coordination when R ≤ ∆
2
a
Ka
and the bank solves the following program:
max
R
V C
s.t. UC ≥ U
Given that V C is linearly increasing in R, the bank sets R∗ = ∆
2
a
Ka
and obtains V C(R∗) = p∆2a−Ka.
The firm gets UC(R∗) = p
¡
∆2c + 2∆a∆c
¢
− C, which is strictly greater than U for Assumption 1,
hence the firm participates.
On the other hand, the minimum utility of the bank in the bankruptcy case is V
¡
RIRβ
¢
=
Π (1, 1)− U , which can be rewritten as
V
¡
RIRβ
¢
= p
¡
∆2a +∆
2
c
¢
−Ka + p22∆a∆c −BfKc. (A3)
It is easy to verify that:
V C(R∗) < V
¡
RIRβ
¢
⇐⇒ BfKc < p∆2c + p22∆a∆c (A4)
which holds for Assumption 1. We then rule out the possibility for the bank to set R ≤ ∆
2
a
Ka
at
equilibrium.
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